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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
without people) were also used in a previous ERP study to explore 
the time course of person perception and ToM (Wang et al., 2010). 
They found the peak amplitudes of P200 for person perception 
and ToM cartoons were significantly more positive than for scene 
cartoons. During 1000–1300 ms epochs, the mean amplitude of 
late positive component (LPC) for person perception was more 
positive than for scene representation, while LPC for ToM was 
more positive than for person perception. But this study contains 
a number of shortcomings. Firstly, “person cartoons” and “ToM 
cartoons” consisted of pictures with one or two persons. The pro-
cessing of different numbers of people could influence the ERP 
waveforms, which might affect the experimental results. Secondly, 
the one-person figures and two-person figures were mixed up in 
those ToM cartoons. As a result, the above study has not revealed 
the difference between understanding the one-person mind and 
understanding interactive minds (Wang et al., 2010). The present 
study differentiated two kinds of ToM: understanding single-person 
mind and understanding the interactive mind. Our experiment 
materials were Chinese idioms, which can guarantee the consist-
ency of the material in visual form.
Many electrophysiological studies were carried out to inves-
tigate the dynamic processing of understanding the single mind 
and revealed the time course of the processing (Liu et al., 2004, 
2009a,b; Sabbagh et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008). In an ERP study, 
participants were asked to perform an “unexpected transform” task 
with cartoon animations (Liu et al., 2004). A late ERP component 
(peaking around 800 ms post-stimulus) with a left-frontal scalp 
INTRODUCTION
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to understanding other’s mental 
states, such as beliefs, intentions, emotions, and thoughts, to predict 
other’s behaviors. ToM is also called mentalizing, or mind-reading, 
which is a major ingredient in successful social interactions (Frith 
and Frith, 1999). Wimmer and Perner (1983) investigated the rep-
resentation of wrong beliefs in young children. Since then, studies 
concerning ToM have largely been driven by questions arising from 
the field of cognitive neuroscience. Most of the current studies 
have been focusing on the understanding of the individual mental 
state. However, we often need to understand two or multi-person 
minds during social interaction in real life. Based on the hierar-
chical hypothesis about ToM, understanding the single mind and 
understanding the interactive mind might be two different levels 
of ToM processing.
In the field of cognitive neuroscience, researchers often com-
pared reading the single mind (e.g., desire, belief, and intention, 
etc,) with the non-mental representation. Belief stories and photo-
graph stories were used in an event-related potential (ERP) study 
to investigate electrophysiological correlates of reasoning belief and 
non-mental representations (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000). Results 
indicated that ERP elicited by these two tasks differed beginning 
at 300 ms post-stimulus: beliefs were associated with an enhanced 
positivity over left-frontal sites and a stronger negativity over left 
parietal sites. The “ToM cartoons” (cartoons involving people and 
also requiring ToM for comprehension), “person cartoons” (car-
toons involving people), and “scene cartoons” (cartoons of scenes 
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distribution, which was inconsistent with a source possibly in the 
left orbitofrontal cortex, differentiated judgments about belief and 
reality. The false-belief paradigm includes two classic tasks: unex-
pected-transfer and deceptive-appearance. The unexpected-trans-
fer paradigm was used to study the time course of ToM (Liu et al., 
2004). The deceptive-appearance paradigm was used to explore the 
brain electrophysiological activity with false-belief reasoning and 
true-belief reasoning in adults (Wang et al., 2008). Compared with 
true-belief, false-belief reasoning elicited significant declined late 
negative component (LNC) in the time window from 400 to 800 ms. 
Both of the two studies we mentioned above used first-order false-
belief task. However, Liu et al. (2009a) adopted diverse-desires, 
diverse-beliefs, and diverse-physical judgment tasks to investigate 
neural system of desire and belief judgment. They found that a 
mid-frontal late slow wave (LSW) was associated with desire and 
belief judgments and a right-posterior LSW was only associated 
with belief judgments. Most of the studies on the research of ToM 
were done in adults. However, a study has made comparisons of 
neural correlates of ToM between adults and children (Liu et al., 
2009b). They found that in adults, a LSW, with a left-frontal scalp 
distribution, was associated with reasoning about beliefs. This LSW 
was also observed in children who could correctly reason about the 
characters’ beliefs but not in children who failed false-belief ques-
tions. In almost all of studies on the neural correlates of ToM, the 
participants were asked to reason about false belief, desire or inten-
tion. However, Sabbagh et al.’s (2004) study on the neural systems 
underlying mental-state decoding showed that decoding mental 
states from pictures of eyes was associated with an N270–400 com-
ponent over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the 
right hemisphere. In summary, we can conclude that the process-
ing of understanding single-person mind was related to the LSW.
The mentioned above studies about the electrophysiological 
correlates of ToM were mostly to understand a one-person mind, 
however “understanding of the human mind can be further deepened 
by moving from one-person neuroscience toward two- and multi-
person neuroscience, both conceptually and experimentally.” (Hari 
and Kujala, 2009; p470). We suppose that the ToM consists of a 
hierarchical framework. Understanding a one-person mind and 
understanding an interactive mind were different levels of ToM, 
and the level of understanding an interactive mind is higher than 
understanding a one-person mind. Consequently, the present 
study was to compare the differences between understanding the 
single mind and understanding the interactive mind. Social inter-
action is a central concept to understanding the nature of social life. 
Social interaction involves communication in all its forms, such 
as cooperation, competition, helping, playing, informing, ques-
tioning, negotiating, bargaining, voting, and bluffing (Hari and 
Kujala, 2009). A study indicated that during the “live” interaction, 
as compared to the recorded condition (watched a video of the 
interaction), greater activation was seen in brain regions involved 
in right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), anterior cingulated cor-
tex and so on (Redcay et al., 2010). Another study sought to char-
acterize neural processes related to aspects of social cognition and 
empathy. The results found the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 
temporal lobe, precuneus, occipital lobe showed an increased level 
of activation for the stimuli with two persons compared to stim-
uli with only one-person (Krämer et al., 2010). Leng and Zhou 
(2010) explored to what extent the brain activity was modulated 
by the interpersonal relationship between the individual and the 
other agent, who could be a friend or a stranger. They found the 
P300 was modulated by the interpersonal relationship between 
the observer and the other agent. Social cognition suggested that 
self-projection was the basis of reading the single mind. Perceivers 
may construct a mental representation of a target’s experience, 
predict the kinds of thoughts and feelings they may have in such 
a situation and then assume that the target of mentalizing will 
think or feel much the same thing (Mitchell, 2009). Some scholars 
believed that understanding of interactive behavior and mind can 
be explained in the frame of “shared action representation” theory 
(Sebanz et al., 2006; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008). This theory indi-
cated that we can only accurately understanding the interactive 
mind on the basis of representing all individuals’ contributions 
to an action and understanding the relations between persons 
and their actions in the interaction. According to the hypothesis, 
we supposed that understanding an interactive mind was more 
complex than understanding a single mind. And we also wanted 
to explore the differences of the dynamic processing between 
understanding an interactive mind and understanding a single 
mind. The processing of reading interactive mind exists in such 
two situations. First, the individual, as one of the participants in 
the interpersonal interaction, responds to other persons’ behaviors 
and minds. Second, the individual infers others’ mental states while 
observing their interactive activities. The present study belongs to 
the second situation.
Similar to cartoon or picture, the verbal material/story was often 
used as experimental stimuli in the previous ToM studies (Saxe and 
Powell, 2006; Abraham et al., 2008, 2010; Liu et al., 2009a). The pre-
sent study employed the Chinese four-character idioms (cheng-yu) 
as visual stimuli to convey the descriptive content to ToM. Chinese 
four-character idioms are brief and concise expressions established 
by long-term usage and recognized through social practices (Yu 
et al., 2006). Many idioms describe one-person’s mental activity, for 
example, zi-gao-fen-yong (in Chinese: ), which in English 
means one-person volunteers to do something. Another example 
depicting the interactive minds of social interaction is fu-chang-fu-
sui (in Chinese: ) and its English translation is harmony 
between husband and wife. Consequently, Chinese four-character 
idioms are suitable verbal materials to study the ToM and we can 
investigate reading the single mind and reading the interactive 
mind by reading different types of Chinese four-character idioms. 
Previous studies mostly have focused on the electrophysiological 
correlates of reasoning desire, belief, and intention, but the present 
study has been made on the investigation of the neural dynamics 
that underlie understanding mental state from Chinese idioms.
Using three types of Chinese four characters idioms – “physical 
representation idioms,” “the single mind idioms,” and “the inter-
active-mind idioms,” the present study was designed to explore 
the dissociative electrophysiological correlates between reading the 
single mind and reading the interactive mind. Based on previous 
fMRI results that the MPFC, temporal lobe, precuneus, occipital 
lobe showed an increased level of activation for the stimuli with 
two persons compared to stimuli with only one-person (Krämer 
et al., 2010) and previous ERPs study that the mean amplitude of 
LPC for ToM was more positive than for person perception (Wang 
Wang et al. Reading the single- and interactive-mind
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17 words. All words were nouns. The scene probe words included 
narrowness, expansion, majesty, and so on, and the mental probe 
words included pleasure, relaxation, sorrow, and so on.
The time course of a trial was as follows: First, the fixation point 
appeared in the center of the screen for 500 ms indicating the start 
of a new trial. Then, participants saw a screen with an idiom for 
1500 ms. Finally, a probe word was present for 2000 ms. The ITI 
among the trials were randomized from 400 to 600 ms. In the experi-
ment, participants were required to understand the meaning of the 
Chinese idioms, and imagine the scene shape or reason the people’s 
mentality in idioms. Then, they judged whether the contents of the 
Chinese idioms were consistent with the contents of the probe words 
by pressing a number key. The inconsistent probe words were oppo-
site to the contents of the idioms, which ensured the participants to 
understand the meaning of the idioms when they pressed the incon-
sistent key. The experiment consisted of 210 trials and each of three 
categories of the idioms included 70 trials. The experiments were 
divided into two blocks, with 105 trials of approximately 8 min in 
each block. The idioms were presented in pseudo-random order. The 
experimental order was balanced among participants. The responses 
to three types of cartoons were counterbalanced between partici-
pants to avoid the sequence effects. Before the formal experiment, 
participants were first to have practice experiments that consist of 
15 trials. These trials were similar but different from the following 
formal session in the ERP experiment.
ElECTROphysIOlOgICal RECORDINg aND aNalysIs
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp sites 
using Ag–AgCl electrodes mounted in an elastic cap according to 
the International 10/20 System. All electrode recordings were ref-
erenced to an electrode placed at the right mastoid, and the EEG 
data were re-referenced off-line to linked mastoid electrodes by 
subtracting from each sample of data recorded at each channel 
one-half the activity recorded at the left mastoid. The horizontal 
electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed 
1.5 cm lateral to the left and right external canthi. Eye blinks were 
recorded from left supraorbital and infraorbital electrodes. All inter-
electrode impedance was maintained below 5 kΩ. EEG and EOG 
were amplified using a 0.05 to 100-Hz band pass and continuously 
sampled at 1000 Hz/channel for off-line analysis. EOG artifacts of 
eyes blink and horizontal move were revised from all trials auto-
matically using Scan software. EEG contaminated with artifacts due 
to amplifier clipping, bursts of electromyographic (EMG) activity, 
et al., 2010), we hypothesized that the amplitude of ERP related to 
reading the interactive mind would be larger than that of reading 
the single mind, and that the amplitude of ERP related to reading 
the single mind would be larger than that of physical representation. 
According to the study (Wang et al., 2010), they found the P200 for 
the ToM and person perception conditions was significantly larger 
than that for the scene condition; then, the LPC amplitude elicited 
by ToM was larger than that induced by person perception. We 
proposed that the ERP component at an earlier period would be 
associated with reading the single mind that separates from that of 
physical representation, and that the ERP component at later period 
would be associated with understanding the interactive mind that 
separates from that of understanding the single mind.
MaTERIals aND METhODs
paRTICIpaNTs
Twenty graduate or undergraduate students (mean age = 22 years; 
range = 19–26 years; 10 males and 10 females) participated in 
the study for pay. Four participants provided excessive electro-
physiological artifact during recording and were excluded from 
the final sample of sixteen participants (mean age = 23 years; 
range = 19–26 years; seven males and nine females) for ERP analy-
ses. All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and reported no history of organic or acquired 
brain damage. Informed written consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to EEG recording.
sTIMUlI aND pROCEDURE
In the study we grouped Chinese idioms into three types: the first 
type was physical representation idiom, which described natural 
scenery or living environment. For example, chong-shan-jun-ling 
(in Chinese: ), which in English means lofty and precipi-
tous peaks. The second type was reading the single mind idiom, 
which described a single personal activity and their typical themes 
were about people’s feelings or behavior. For example, gu-ku-ling-
ding (in Chinese: ), which in English means friendless and 
wretched. The third type was reading the interactive-mind idiom, 
which described the interaction of two or more people and their 
typical themes were about competition, cooperation, help, love, 
and so on. For example, fu-chang-fu-sui (in Chinese: ).
First, we found all types of idioms in the “Dictionary of Chinese 
Idioms.” Then we arranged all idioms at random. Afterward, we 
found 14 college students to judge which kind the idioms were. 
Finally, we selected 70 idioms each kind based on the students’ 
judgment. All the idioms were presented as picture. They were 
of uniform size (4.5 cm in width, 1.2 cm in height), and each 
photograph was 960 × 720 pixels. Each idiom is Song font and 
its font size was 26. Idioms in white color were presented in the 
centerfield of a black background. The participants watched the 
experimental stimuli subtending a visual angle of approximate 3°. 
We also matched the word stroke number, the term frequency, 
the word sentimental color (commendatory term or derogatory 
term; shown in Table 1): stroke number: F(2, 209) = 0.19, p > 0.05; 
term frequency: F(2, 209) = 1.93, p > 0.05; sentimental color: F(2, 
209) = 2.23, p > 0.05. In addition, we also found two types of 
probe words: a category of words described the form of scene and 
the other described people’s mentality; each category consisted of 
Table 1 | Lexical–statistical properties for three types of Chinese idioms.
Idioms’ types Stroke 
(M ± SD)
Frequency Sentimental 
color (M ± SD)
Physical 
representation
30.39 ± 6.58 48 2.27 ± 0.72
Reading the 
single mind
30.10 ± 7.81 83 2.03 ± 0.82
Reading the 
interactive mind
29.67 ± 6.29 96 2.04 ± 0.75
Chinese idiom frequency is measured as a word-per-million figure using the 
People’s daily Character Frequency Statistics (1998).
Wang et al. Reading the single- and interactive-mind
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ERp REsUlTs
We designed the physical representation condition to provide a 
control baseline. Therefore, any differences in waveforms between 
the reading the single mind and physical representation condi-
tions reveals the components associated with reading the single 
mind, and any differences in waveforms between the reading the 
interactive-mind and physical representation conditions revealed 
the components associated with reading the interactive mind. Any 
difference in waveforms between the reading the single mind and 
reading the interactive-mind conditions revealed the components 
that differed between reading the single mind and reading the 
interactive mind. Figure 1 displays the grand average waveforms 
for all three conditions from nine electrodes: F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, 
C4, P1, Pz, and P2. After artifact rejection, the mean numbers of 
valid trials were 54, 54, and 53 epochs used in the ERP averaging 
for physical representation, reading the single mind, and reading 
the interactive-mind condition.
It was clear from visual inspections of the waveforms in Figure 1 
that there was a LPC differentiation between the reading the single 
mind (more positive) and physical representation conditions and 
that there was also a LPC differentiation between the reading the 
interactive-mind (more positive) and physical representation con-
ditions. These differentiations were around 500 ms post-stimulus. 
To ensure this, mean amplitude in the 500- to 700-ms post-stimulus 
epoch was computed for each condition from all electrodes in the 
3 × 3 grid of scalp locations. Visual inspections of the waveforms 
in Figure 1 also suggested that there was an effect of condition 
around 700–900 ms post-stimulus. To ensure this, mean ampli-
tudes in the 700- to 800 and 800- to 900-ms post-stimulus epochs 
were computed for each condition from all electrodes in the 3 × 3 
grid of scalp locations. The results indicated that there were no 
or peak-to-peak deflection exceeding ±75 μV were excluded from 
trials. In the present study, EEG of idiom representation period 
was selected for critical analysis, and only the trials that subjects 
correctly responded were overlapped and averaged. The ERP were 
time-locked to the onset of idiom representation. The data were 
transformed off-line to epochs of −200–1000 ms. According to the 
previous studies (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2009a) and 
the ERP data of present study, the nine electrode sites were chosen 
for statistical analysis. The electrodes in a 3 × 3 grid encompassing 
scalp locations from left to right (laterality) and from anterior to 
posterior (caudality) were: F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P1, Pz, and P2. 
The amplitudes of P200 and N400 were measured from baseline 
to peak, and the mean amplitudes of the LPC were measured in 
100 ms intervals over 500–1000 ms. The ERP components were 
analyzed using three-way repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVAs): condition (physical representation, reading the single 
mind, reading the interactive mind), laterality (left, midline, right), 
caudality (frontal, central, parietal). When necessary, for all of our 
analyses, p values were adjusted using the Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rection. Bonferroni correction was used for multiple comparisons.
REsUlTs
BEhavIORal pERfORMaNCE
There were no significant differences in the participants’ accuracy 
for physical representation, reading the single mind, and reading 
the interactive-mind Chinese idioms (92%, 91%, and 91% correct, 
respectively), F(2, 45) = 0.43, p = 0.65. This indicated that the dif-
ficulty of three conditions was equivalent. There were no significant 
differences in the participants’ reaction time for three conditions 
either (850.61 ± 187.61 ms, 885.87 ± 212.33 ms, 846.76 ± 197.90 ms 
reaction time, respectively), F(2, 45) = 0.19, p = 0.83.
FIgure 1 | grand average event-related brain potential waveforms for the three types of Chinese idioms of physical representation, reading the single 
mind, and reading the interactive mind from nine electrodes.
Wang et al. Reading the single- and interactive-mind
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that in the frontal area, there were significant differences between 
the conditions, F(2, 30) = 8.90, p = 0.001. Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant differ-
ences between the reading the single mind (1.71 ± 0.77 μV) and 
physical representation condition (0.60 ± 0.64 μV), p = 0.04, and 
there were significant differences between the reading the interac-
tive-mind (2.17 ± 0.75 μV) and physical representation condition 
(0.60 ± 0.64 μV), p = 0.002, but there was no significant difference 
between reading the single mind (1.71 ± 0.77 μV) and reading the 
interactive mind (2.17 ± 0.75 μV), p = 0.736. We also found in 
the central area where there were significant differences between 
the conditions, F(2, 30) = 4.13, p = 0.026. Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant differ-
ences between the reading the interactive-mind (3.22 ± 0.67 μV) 
and physical representation condition (2.07 ± 0.67 μV), p = 0.042, 
but there was no significant differences between the reading the 
single mind (2.67 ± 0.79 μV) and physical representation  condition 
differences among three task conditions in P200 [F(2, 30) = 1.95, 
MSE = 10.55, p = 0.16], and N400 [F(2, 30) = 1.23, MSE = 7.15, 
p = 0.31; shown in Table 2].
Late positive component
A 3 (condition) × 3 (laterality) × 3 (caudality) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted on the mean amplitudes of single electrodes 
in the 3 × 3 grid of scalp locations for the 500- to 600-ms post-
stimulus epochs. The results of the ANOVAs showed that there 
was not a significant two-way interaction between condition and 
laterality, F(4, 60) = 0.69, MSE = 0.60, p = 0.557, nor a significant 
three-way interaction between condition, laterality, and caudality, 
F(8, 120) = 0.49, MSE = 0.58, p = 0.777. There were moderately sig-
nificant main effects of task condition, F(2, 30) = 3.19, MSE = 10.45, 
p = 0.056. We also found there was a significant two-way interac-
tion between condition and caudality, F(4, 60) = 7.86, MSE = 1.72, 
p = 0.001 (shown in Figure 2). Follow-up means contrasts revealed 
Table 2 | ANOVA of P200, N400, and the LPC amplitudes measured at 100 ms intervals during the 500- to 1000-ms period.
Time window Condition main Condition × Caudality M ± Se (amplitudes, μV) Post hoc test 
(ms) effects F(2, 30) interaction effects F(4, 60)
Physical 
representation
reading the 
single mind
reading the 
interactive mind
P200 1.954 1.372 5.61 ± 0.47 6.21 ± 0.57 6.30 ± 0.49 1–2, 2–3, 1–3
N400 1.232 1.455 −1.59 ± 0.58 −1.29 ± 0.54 −1.14 ± 0.51 1–2, 2–3, 1–3
500–600 3.193 7.861** 0.60 ± 0.64 1.71 ± 0.77 2.17 ± 0.75 1–2*, 2–3, 1–3**
600–700 5.035* 6.546** 1.58 ± 0.62 2.74 ± 0.71 2.96 ± 0.59 1–2, 2–3, 1–3*
700–800 2.847 13.45* 1.44 ± 0.56 1.90 ± 0.64 2.67 ± 0.56 1–2, 2–3, 1–3*
800–900 1.13 2.122 1.14 ± 0.42 1.31 ± 0.56 1.71 ± 0.44 1–2, 2–3, 1–3
900–1000 0.955 1.556 0.87 ± 0.40 1.00 ± 0.53 1.39 ± 0.40 1–2, 2–3, 1–3
In the post hoc test, the number 1 physical representation, 2 reading the single mind, and 3 reading the interactive mind. (***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05).
FIgure 2 | (A) Interaction between condition and caudality in 500–600 ms. (B) Interaction between condition and caudality in 600–700 ms. (C) Interaction between 
condition and caudality in 700–800 ms.
Wang et al. Reading the single- and interactive-mind
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the central area where there were significant differences between 
the conditions, F(2, 30) = 6.09, p = 0.006. Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant differ-
ences between the reading the single mind (2.74 ± 0.71 μV) and 
physical representation condition (1.58 ± 0.62 μV), p = 0.044, and 
there were significant differences between the reading the interac-
tive mind (2.96 ± 0.59 μV) and physical representation condition 
(1.58 ± 0.62 μV), p = 0.030, but there was no significant difference 
between reading the single mind (2.74 ± 0.71 μV) and reading the 
interactive mind (2.96 ± 0.59 μV), p = 1.000 (shown in Table 2). 
This result confirms what is observed in the waveforms in Figure 1, 
a LPC differentiation between the reading the single mind (more 
positive) and physical representation conditions and a LPC differ-
entiation between the reading the interactive mind (more positive) 
and physical representation conditions. The results of the ANOVAs 
showed that there was not a significant two-way interaction between 
condition and laterality, F(4, 60) = 1.36, MSE = 0.60, p = 0.267, nor 
a significant three-way interaction between condition, laterality, 
and caudality, F(8, 120) = 0.42, MSE = 0.71, p = 0.829. This pattern 
of results suggested that in the 600- to 700-ms epoch, there was a 
frontal–central ERP component associated with both reading the 
single mind and reading the interactive mind. This was further illus-
trated in Figure 3, which displays the mean amplitude difference 
between the conditions (physical representation subtracted from 
reading the single mind) at the Fz site, as well as the correspond-
ing scalp topographic map. Darker red indicates positive wave of 
conditions in scalp topographic map.
A 3 (condition) × 3 (laterality) × 3 (caudality) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted on the mean amplitudes of single electrodes 
in the 3 × 3 grid of scalp locations for the 700- to 800-ms post-
stimulus epochs. The results of the ANOVAs showed that there were 
no main effects of task condition, F(2, 30) = 2.85, MSE = 13.66, 
p = 0.092, and there was not a significant two-way interaction 
between condition and laterality, F(4, 60) = 0.68, MSE = 0.96, 
p = 0.57, nor a significant three-way interaction between condition, 
laterality, and caudality, F(8, 120) = 0.79, MSE = 1.18, p = 0.545. 
There was a significant two-way interaction between condition 
and caudality, F(4, 60) = 3.85, MSE = 3.50, p = 0.024 (shown in 
Figure 2). Follow-up means contrasts revealed that in the frontal 
area, there were significant differences between the conditions, 
F(2, 30) = 5.54, p = 0.009. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise com-
parisons showed that there were significant differences between 
the reading the interactive mind (1.88 ± 0.56 μV) and reading 
the single mind condition (0.96 ± 0.56 μV), p = 0.019, and there 
were significant differences between the reading the  interactive 
mind (1.88 ± 0.56 μV) and physical representation condition 
(0.48 ± 0.46 μV), p = 0.017, but there was no significant difference 
between reading the single mind (0.96 ± 0.56 μV) and physical 
representation (0.48 ± 0.46 μV), p = 1.000. We also found in the 
central area where there were significant differences between the 
conditions, F(2, 30) = 5.02, p = 0.013. Bonferroni-corrected pair-
wise comparisons showed that there were significant differences 
between the reading the interactive-mind (2.67 ± 0.56 μV) and 
physical representation condition (1.44 ± 0.56 μV), p = 0.027, and 
there were moderately significant differences between the reading 
the interactive-mind (2.67 ± 0.56 μV) and reading the single mind 
condition (1.90 ± 0.64 μV), p = 0.085, but there was no significant 
(2.07 ± 0.67 μV), p = 0.302, and there was no significant differ-
ence between reading the single mind (2.67 ± 0.79 μV) and read-
ing the interactive mind (3.22 ± 0.67 μV), p = 0.691 (shown in 
Table 2). This result confirms what is observed in the waveforms 
in Figure 1, a LPC differentiation between the reading the single 
mind (more positive) and physical representation conditions and 
a LPC differentiation between the reading the interactive mind 
(more positive) and physical representation conditions. This pat-
tern of results suggests that in the 500- to 600-ms epoch, there was 
a frontal ERP component associated with both reading the single 
mind and reading the interactive mind. This was further illustrated 
in Figure 3, which displays the mean amplitude difference between 
the conditions (physical representation subtracted from reading 
the single mind) at the Fz site, as well as the corresponding scalp 
topographic map. Darker red indicates positive wave of conditions 
in scalp topographic map.
A 3 (condition) × 3 (laterality) × 3 (caudality) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted on the mean amplitudes of single electrodes 
in the 3 × 3 grid of scalp locations for the 600- to 700-ms post-
stimulus epochs. The results of the ANOVAs showed that there 
were main effects of task condition, F(2, 30) = 5.04, MSE = 11.60, 
p = 0.013. We also found there was a significant two-way interac-
tion between condition and caudality, F(4, 60) = 6.55, MSE = 2.85, 
p = 0.003 (shown in Figure 2). Follow-up means contrasts revealed 
that in the frontal area, there were significant differences between 
the conditions, F(2, 30) = 11.53, p < 0.001. Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant differ-
ences between the reading the single mind (2.05 ± 0.70 μV) and 
physical representation condition (0.35 ± 0.57 μV), p = 0.014, and 
there were significant differences between the reading the interac-
tive mind (2.11 ± 0.63 μV) and physical representation condition 
(0.35 ± 0.57 μV), p < 0.001, but there was no significant difference 
between reading the single mind (2.05 ± 0.70 μV) and reading the 
interactive mind (2.11 ± 0.63 μV), p = 1.000. We also found in 
FIgure 3 | The mean amplitude difference between conditions (physical 
representation subtracted from reading the single mind and reading the 
single mind subtracted from reading the interactive mind) at the Fz site, 
as well as the corresponding scalp topographies (physical representation 
subtracted from reading the single mind in the 500- to 600 and 600- to 
700-ms epoch and reading the single mind subtracted from reading the 
interactive mind in the 700- to 800-ms epoch).
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2003; Blakemore et al., 2004; Gallagher and Frith, 2004; Saxe and 
Wexler, 2005; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2006; 
Mitchell, 2006, 2008; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006; 
Sommer et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2008, 2010; Coricelli and Nagel, 
2009). While the previous fMRI studies have been limited by the fact 
that the temporal resolution of fMRI is relatively low, the advantage 
made in the present study is that, by taking advantage of the greater 
temporal resolution of ERPs, we have revealed the time course by 
which the physical representation precedes the representation of 
ToM. Esslen et al. (2008) found in the reflective self condition, only 
dorsal parts of the MPFC were activated, while the pre-reflective 
self condition showed strong involvement of the ventral MPFC. 
Therefore, MPFC plays a predominant role was in the understand-
ing self and understanding other’s mind. That is, the MPFC was a 
necessary component of reasoning of ToM.
 A study found the questions of false-belief and true-belief elic-
ited LNC at centro-frontal sites in the 400- to 800-ms epoch (Wang 
et al., 2008). Another neuroscience study identified a mid-frontal 
LSW was associated with desire and belief judgments in the 800- 
to 850-ms epoch (Liu et al., 2009a). Wang et al. (2010) indicated 
a LPC associated with ToM and maximal amplitudes of the LPC 
at the frontal sites. We also found reading the single mind and 
reading the interactive-mind conditions elicited more intense and 
extensive electrical activity than physical representation conditions 
in the frontal area of the scalp, which is consistent with previous 
findings. These results demonstrated that a late ERP component 
over frontal regions was associated with ToM processing. The ToM 
processing requires several cognitive processes. Firstly, we must 
perceive the characters. Secondly, based on those perceptions about 
the person, we can read the others’ mind. It is possible that the late 
ERP component over frontal regions reflect the processes associated 
with integrating mental representation versus person representa-
tion within a given context.
 The present study has both similarities with and differences 
to prior ERP study. In the study Liu et al. (2009b) and Wang et al. 
(2010), the dissociation of mental representation and non-mental 
representation emerged at 775–850 ms and 300–1500 ms, whereas 
in the present study, the dissociation of mental representation and 
non-mental representation emerged at 500–700 ms. This difference 
may be due to experimental material. Neuroscience studies of ToM 
used many experimental paradigms, including the recognition of 
mental-state terms (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994), stories (Saxe and 
Powell, 2006; Liu et al., 2009a), single-frame cartoons (Gallagher 
et al., 2000), comic strip cartoons (Kobayashi et al., 2007a,b; 
Sommer et al., 2007), and interactive games (Gallagher et al., 2002; 
Polezzi et al., 2008; Kamarajan et al., 2009; Boksem and De Crener, 
2010). The present study task is more difficult than single-frame 
cartoon task and less difficult than comic strip cartoons task and 
interactive games task, due to different task difficulty, the results of 
the present study differed from the previous ERP studies.
REaDINg ThE sINglE MIND vERsUs REaDINg ThE INTERaCTIvE MIND
A major finding of the present study is the dissociation between 
understanding the single mind and understanding the interac-
tive mind. In the 700- to 800-ms epoch, the mean amplitudes of 
LPC over frontal–central for reading the interactive mind was 
more positive than that for reading the single mind and physical 
differences between the reading the single mind (1.90 ± 0.64 μV) 
and physical representation conditions (1.44 ± 0.56 μV), p = 0.950 
(shown in Table 2). This result confirms what is observed in the 
waveforms in Figure 1, a LPC differentiation between the read-
ing the interactive mind (more positive)and physical representa-
tion conditions and a LPC differentiation between the reading the 
 interactive mind (more positive) and reading the single mind con-
ditions. This pattern of results suggested that in the 700- to 800-ms 
post-stimulus epoch, there was a frontal–central ERP component 
associated with reading the interactive mind only but not reading 
the single mind. This was further illustrated in Figure 3, which 
displays the mean amplitude difference between the conditions 
(reading the single mind subtracted from reading the interactive 
mind) at the Fz site, as well as the corresponding scalp topographic 
map. Darker red indicates positive wave of conditions in scalp topo-
graphic map. In the 800- to 900-ms, there were no main or interac-
tion effect of any of the condition contrasts. Finally, there were no 
significant differences between the conditions at any locations for 
any of the epochs. Thus, the effects of conditions appeared in the 
500- to 600, 600- to 700, and 700- to 800-ms.
DIsCUssION
ThEORy Of MIND vERsUs physICal REpREsENTaTION
The present study was designed to explore the time course of the 
dissociation between reading the single mind and reading the 
interactive mind. The ERP results revealed that in 500–700 ms, 
the mean amplitudes of LPC over frontal for reading the single 
mind and reading the interactive mind was significantly greater 
than that for physical representation, while there was no difference 
between the former two. The above results suggest that individuals 
can distinguish mental processing from non-mental processing in 
500–700 ms. Sabbagh and Taylor (2000) indicated that ERPs elicited 
by mental representation and non-mental representation differed 
in 600–840 ms. Our study also found similar results. These results 
suggest that individuals can distinguish mental processing from 
non-mental processing at later post-stimulus stage.
 ToM processing depends upon at least two kinds of representa-
tion: representation of another person and a representation of that 
other person’s mental state. While representation of a person is a 
likely prerequisite for ToM, achieving a representation of another’s 
mental state is the core feature of ToM (Leslie, 1999). Reading the 
single mind and reading the interactive mind both need the rep-
resentation of person. In this study, the N400 indicated possibly 
the individual represented person or natural objects and these two 
processing both belong to the level of consciousness, therefore there 
were no significant difference among three task conditions in N400. 
In 500–700 ms, reading the single and interactive mind both need 
the representation person perception and person’s mental states, 
while physical representation only needs representation natural 
objects, therefore the mean amplitudes of LPC for reading the single 
mind and reading the interactive mind were significantly more 
positive than that for physical representation.
 Over the past decade, a highly consistent observation in cogni-
tive neuroscience had been the demonstration that ToM engaged a 
set of brain regions including MPFC, TPJ, and superior temporal 
sulcus (STS) as well as temporal poles and amygdale (Frith and 
Frith, 2001, 2003, 2006; Calarge et al., 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 
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reading the single mind and reading the interactive mind are two 
different processing. Previous neuroimaging researches found 
several brain areas associated with social interaction. These brain 
areas includes: MPFC (Iacoboni et al., 2004), precuneus (Iacoboni 
et al., 2004), paracingulate cortex (Rilling et al., 2004; Walter et al., 
2004), amygdale (Spezi et al., 2007). It was clear from Figure 1 
that the differentiation between reading the interactive mind and 
reading the single mind in lateral frontal sites was bigger than in 
medial frontal sites. A previous study also demonstrated a role 
for lateral frontopolar cortex in the social domain (Raposo et al., 
2010). They found that medial frontopolar cortex was modulated 
by other judgment relative to self judgment. Lateral frontopo-
lar cortex was significantly activated during relational condition 
compared to self judgment. The relational condition was a more 
sophisticated mentalizing task that required participants to com-
pare their own judgments with their beliefs about another person’s 
judgments. The combined results demonstrate that there are sev-
eral “core” regions – including MPFC, precuneus, paracingulate 
cortex, amygdale – may contribute to interactive-mind reasoning. 
Understanding interactive mind needs the interaction of these 
core regions. Compared to other regions, the MPFC maybe plays 
a more important role in understanding interactive mind. The 
likelihood that the MPFC involved in understanding interactive 
mind is higher than other regions.
 We know little about the dynamics processing of social interac-
tion. Almost all of studies about the neuroimaging of social inter-
action utilized Ultimatum game or monetary gain and loss game 
(Kamarajan et al., 2009; Mobbs et al., 2009; Boksem and De Crener, 
2010; Maarten et al., 2010). And participants were asked to actually 
participate in the game. These paradigms used money as a feedback 
stimulus to study people’s evaluation on the feedback results and 
found feedback related negativity (FRN) was associated with mon-
etary gain and loss feedback. However, the present study required 
participants to understand the interactive mind from Chinese idi-
oms. This may be the reason why the results we have gotten were not 
consistent with previous researches. We used verbal form-idiom-as 
experimental material and found that a frontal–central LPC was 
observed for reading the interactive mind only in 700–800 ms. In 
summary, we believe that the dynamic processing of reading the 
interactive mind occurs mainly in the 500- to 800-ms, especially in 
the 700- to 800-ms. The present study indicated reading the single 
mind can be seen to underlie reading the interactive mind. This 
hierarchical framework support social cognition and interpersonal 
interaction.
Our data provide a direct comparison between the electro-
physiological correlates for reading the single mind as well as 
reading the interactive mind. Our findings show that reading the 
interactive mind overlaps the neural system capable of reading the 
single mind but requires the involvement of an additional system. 
This suggests a developmental account where people’s reading 
the interactive mind builds upon their reading the single mind. 
That is, people firstly are able to read the single mind, and the 
reading the interactive mind builds on that earlier understand-
ing by involving the same mental-state processing characteristic 
of reading the single mind plus an additional the interactive-
mind processing as well. We believe that reading the single mind 
and reading the interactive mind are two different levels of ToM. 
 representation, while there was no difference between the latter 
two. That is, the dissociation between understanding the interactive 
mind and understanding the single mind occurred in the 700- to 
800-ms. As indicated above, we also found a frontal ERP component 
was associated with both reading the single mind and reading the 
interactive mind in the 500- to 700-ms epoch. It means that the 
individual firstly distinguished mental processing from non-mental 
processing, and then distinguished understanding the single mind 
from understanding the interactive mind.
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) argued that there were 
two distinct components of ToM: a social-cognitive and a social-
perceptual component. The social-cognitive component entails 
the conceptual understanding of the mind as a representational 
system, the social-perceptual component includes the capacity 
to distinguish between people and objects, and to make on-line 
rapid judgments about people’s mental state from their facial 
and body expressions. Reading the single mind and reading the 
interactive mind both belong to social-cognitive component and 
they need to reason about mental state. Reading the interactive 
mind first needs to reading individual’s mind in the interac-
tion, which consists with processing of reading the single mind. 
In 500–700 ms, reading the interactive mind possibly indicated 
reading individual’s mind in the interaction, therefore there was 
no significant difference between reading the single mind and 
reading the interactive mind in 500–700 ms. Sebanz indicated 
that we can only accurately understanding the interactive mind 
on the basis of representing all individuals’ contributions to an 
action and understanding the relations between persons and their 
actions in the interaction, whereas reading the single mind only 
understands one-person contributes to action. In 700–800 ms, 
reading the interactive mind possibly processed all individuals’ 
contributions to an action and understood the relations of “the 
individual and the individual,” “the behavior and the behavior” 
in the interaction. Reading the single mind only understands 
one-person contributes to action, therefore there were significant 
difference between reading the interactive mind and reading the 
single mind in 700–800 ms.
Arguments in favor of brain modules often begin with the 
assumption that social interaction gives rise to benefits that are 
associated with the selection pressure necessary for developing 
specialized brain modules responsible for carrying out domain-
specific social-cognitive processes (Adolphs et al., 2001). To some 
extent, the differences of the LPC between reading the single mind 
and reading the interactive mind are consistent with this view. It 
is likely that in 700–800 ms, a cognitive process specialized for 
reading the interactive mind. Hari and Kujala (2009) emphasized 
the organism–environment system was important for commu-
nications. Understanding the organism–environment system for 
reading the interactive mind is more complex than for reading the 
single mind. Therefore, in 700–800 ms, reading the interactive mind 
recruits higher activity than reading the single mind.
 Up to now, researches about the neural basis of social interaction 
were still in its infancy. Krämer et al. (2010) found that the MPFC, 
temporal lobe, precuneus, occipital lobe showed an increased level 
of activation for the stimuli with two persons compared to stimuli 
with only one-person. To some extent, the present study results 
are consistent with fMRI findings. These results indicated that 
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Reading the single mind is the basis for reading the interactive 
mind and the level of reading the interactive mind is higher than 
the level of reading the single mind. In the future, understand-
ing social interaction can be further deepened in neuroscience, 
and our findings will illuminate electrophysiological correlates 
of social interaction.
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